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philosophy. It is this writer's view that to restrict the seller to just one of
his remedies when he has a just debt against the buyer is inconsistent with
the economic policy of greater distribution of goods. Statutory remedies
like those employed in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act tend to be too
cumbersome with their periods of redemption and forced sales. But this
Act has proved itself to be, in the overall sense, a fairer remedy between
the parties than that afforded by the election doctrine. Perhaps a revision
of the U.C.S.A. to incorporate some of the advantages of the individual
remedies that do exist from the seller's point of view might be beneficial
to both the seller and buyer when simple financing is needed. At present,
Florida is one of the few states that have enacted no legislation covering this
problem.
ALBERT L. WEINTRAUB.
A HALF CENTURY OF JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
FROM BANANAS TO WATCHES
It is conventional in an international sense to characterize States as
members of a family of nations. The members of this community are con-
sidered to be equal from a legal point of view. Accordingly, a State's co-exist-
ence within this framework is conditioned upon its acceptance of limita-
tions that should be observed in the exercise of its inherent sovereignty,
i.e., unlimited powers. The extent of such limitations is subject to several
dynamic pressures. Among these constraining forces are the changing po-
litical beliefs and agitations within the community of nations and the ex-
ternal problems facing individual States.
The adjustment of such potential powers of States to the exigencies
of a harmonized international community presents a fascinating aspect of
international law as reflected by the internal law of the different countries.
Not only are the constitutional and conflicts of law approaches of these
States affected by this international interplay, but also influenced is their
exercise of legislative and judicial powers.
Viewed in its broadest outlines there appears a surprisingly clear trend
in our country away from what we may call our early legal introversion.
This original unwillingness to deal, in a legal sense, with situations involving
foreign elements changed gradually to the disposition to face such problems
without evidencing too much concern over the possibility of a lack of legis-
lative or judicial jurisdiction in the traditional sense.
It is elementary to say that all jurisdiction as exercised by a country
through its various organs is prima facie territorial. Territorial boundaries
are, under this proposition, identical with the limitations imposed upon all
types of jurisdiction exercised by the States. Such a rigid territorialistic atti-
tude was expressed by Huber to the effect that the laws of every State
COMMENTS
have force within its limits and bind all subjects within such confines. To
this he allowed certain exceptions, provided there is no prejudice to the
sovereignty of other States or their citizens.'
For a long time our nation followed this territorialistic doctrine. It
was adopted by Story in his fundamental commentaries:
. . . Another maxim . . . is, that no State or nation can, by its own
laws directly bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons
not resident therein whether they are natural born subjects or other
. . for it would be wholly incompatible with the equality and ex-
clusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any nation should
be at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its own
territory.2
This attitude of legal isolationism coincides with a parallel period in our
national history when we were almost completely occupied with internal
problems and were unwilling and unable to spend our scarce energies on
foreign affairs. The corollary of such a propensity was the development of
a legalistic doctrine leveled at solving our domestic problems, but of limited
applicability to local issues which involved international considerations.
It is against such a background of the past century that we must
examine the developments of the present. The purpose of this writing,
therefore, will be to show, in its broad features, the progressive weakening
of our territorial concepts of jurisdiction and the espousal of a more uni-
versalistic technique. While jurisdiction is the derivative of our legislative
power, it is in the examination of judicial decisions interpreting these legis-
lative commands that this change manifests itself.
The first statute to be examined in relation to this problem will be
the Sherman Act.3 The purpose of this Act was to preserve open com-
petition among our business enterprises in both interstate commerce and
foreign trade. As such, this early Act presented the problem of whether or
not our judiciary would be willing to accept the challenge arising out of
extra-territorial acts which inight be construed to be within the meaning
of the statute.
It is significant that the Sherman Act should have been interpreted at
the turn of the century with an approach which restated and applied the
principlcs expressed by Story. The Supreme Court was called on in Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.4 to decide whether or not the statute
would apply to acts committed in Costa Rica which were intended to re-
strain trade within the United States. Justice Holmes, reaffirming the or-
thodox territorial doctrine, held that the Act could not be defined to in-
clude acts occurring outside of our'own country. He stated that the ". .
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
1. 1 WHEA'roN, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAt. LA W 126 (3d ed. 1846).
2. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THlE CONFLICT OF LAws 30 (3d ed. 1846).
3. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
4. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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or unlawful must be detennined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done."5 Ile felt that to do otherwise ". . . not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sover-
eign, contrary to the comity of nations which the other state concerned
justly might resent."'6 Had the Court wished to interpret the statute to
denote these acts as violations, they had adequate support in the wording
of the Act which stated that "every contract, combination .. .in restraint
of trade of commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is
declared to be illegal." 7
This case supported the proposition that the evasion of this statute
could be accomplished by our own nationals by merely conspiring or acting
outside of our territory in spite of the fact that the intended effect of their
conspiracy would monopolize the internal market which is within our
sovereign jurisdiction. This escape was soon vitiated by decisions8 which held
that combinations or acts which affected the commerce of this country were
within the meaning of the Act.
These last decisions were in line with the international law thought
which recognized that one who, outside of a country, willfully puts into
motion a force to take effect in it, is answerable at the place where the
hbarm is done.9
The Sherman Act was also expressly intended to prohibit the restraint
of foreign trade. This statute had the effect of making combinations or-
ganized in the export trade illegal. To stimulate and promote our export
trade Congress modified this policy in the Webb-Pomerente Act 0 which
relaxed the statutory direction that all combinations in the export trade
were illegal per se." The Court, in the interpretation " of this Act, fol-
5. Id. at 356.
6. Ibid.
7. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
8. United States v. Pacific & A.R. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (a combination
to control transportation within the United States is within the jurisdiction of the United
States notwithstanding the fact that part of the transportation route is outside the United
States); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (a combination of ocean carriers which
affected the foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation here, is within
the meaning of the Sherman Act although the combination was formed abroad); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (monopolization of the supply of
an article abroad has the "effect" of restraining te import trade in the United States and
so was within our jurisdiction).
9. Hunting, Extra-Tenitorial Effect Of The Sherman Act: American Banana Corn.
pany v. United Fruit Company. 6 ILL. L. REv. 34 (1911); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 238 (2d ed. 1947).
10. 40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1946).
11. "Nothing contained in sections 1-7 . . . shall be construed as declaring to be
illegal an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade ...
or an agreement ... provided such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of
trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of the export trade of any domestic
competitor of such association." 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1946).
12. Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 34, 35 (9th Cir. 1944) (a correspondence school
which was engaged in unfair trade practices, sent all of its material outside the United
States. On the defense that there existed no jurisdiction, Judge Minton said:
however, it was conceived, initiated, concocted, and launched on its way in the United
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lowed the pattern set by the later Sherman cases as to the irrelevancy of
the position that acts done outside of our territory were not within the
purview of our legislative jurisdiction.
The extent to which this Act was interpreted was illustrated in United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.' 3 In this case a combination of do-
mestic manufacturers, representing almost all of the export trade in coated
abrasives, established factories abroad and agreed to refrain from exporting
to those countries in which the products of the foreign plants could be
sold more profitably. The defendant's position, that the Webb-Pomerene
Act sanctioned this activity, was dismissed by the court in the statement that
the statute was limited to the sort of export trade which consists in com-
merce in goods. "Export of capital is not export trade."14 Had the Court
talked in terms of "contacts" instead of the "effect" on the business in the
United States it would have taken considerable conceptual juggling to
find the prohibitions of the Act applicable in this case.
It appears established that the necessary element in deciding the ap-
plicability of these anti-trust statutes is whether there is a deleterious effect
on our commerce. "If such effect is present it is immaterial whether the
common understanding was entered into in the United States or abroad."' 5
These anti-trust statutes were, in their nature, quasi-criminal; we will now
examine the territorial extent of the applicability of the criminal law.
As to the criminal legislative jurisdiction of a State there is a general
rule of international law which recognizes the taking of such jurisdiction to
be warranted whenever there are justifiable contacts between the acts to be
declared puuishable and the country enacting the law. Therefore, crimes
against nationals of a country, or against the public interest of that State,
regardless of the place where the acts were committed, may be within the
State's jurisdiction.' This position found articulation in this country in
United States v. Bowman,'7 decided in 1922, wherein the Court applied the
criminal code' to acts which occurred outside of our territory. Unlike the
American Banana case where interests of private competitors were involved,
the conspiracy here was a scheme to defraud the federal government itself.
The defendant's argument of no jurisdiction over the act was overruled by
States. That the persons deceived were all in Latin America is of no consequence. It
is the location of the petitioner's competitors which counts.")
13. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
14. Id. at 963, Wyzanski, D.J.
15. Comment, Application of Anti-Trust Laws To Extra.Territorial Conspiracies, 48
YALE L.J. 1313, 1316, 1317 (1940); United States v. Nord Deutcher Lloyd, 223 U.S.
512( 1912) The Immigration Act of Feb. 20, 1907, 34 STAT. 898, 904, c. 1134 was
applied in giving relief to an immigrant who entered into a contract in Germany which
would be illegal under the Act. The court claiming no extra-territorial effect for the Act
held that the making of a contract may, by the condition which is operative in this
country, make the omission of this act punishable in this country).
16. S.S. Lotus, Permanent Court of International Justice (1927) Series A No. 10;
I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 238 (2d ed. 1947).
17. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
18. 40 STAT. 1015(1918).
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the court when it said: " ... Others (acts) are such that to limit their
locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would greatly curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as
easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
home." 1'9  They felt that there existed " . . . the right of the government
to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially
if committed by its own citizens .... ,20
A noticeable change of emphasis took place ten years later in Blackmer
v. United States21 in which the Court, no longer on the defensive as to the
legislative power of Congress, expressed the thought: "While the legisla-
tion of the Congress, unless the contrary appears, is construed to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the question of
its application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries
are concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power." 22 The de-
fendant in this case, residing in France, was found guilty of contempt by
refusing to appear before a legislative committee. The government attached
his property in this country to satisfy the contempt judgment.
An analogous use of the nationality contact upon which to attach
jurisdiction was employed in Skiriotes v. State of Florida.23 The defendant,
a Florida fisherman, was indicted under a Florida statute2 4 prohibiting the
use of certain fishing devices in the territorial waters of the state. He de-
fended on the ground that his act was accomplished in international waters.
The Court summarily dismissed the question of whether the waters were
territorial or not and restated the Blackmer dicta: " . . . with respect to
such exercise of authority there is no question of international law, but
solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the
citizen in relation to his own government."26 "Even if it were assumed that
the locus of the offense was outside the territorial waters of Florida, it
would not follow that the State could not prohibit its own citizens from
lie use of the described divers' equipment at that place." 27
Lest it be understood that only nationality would be used as a con-
tact in applying our criminal statutes extra-territorially, the decision in
United States v. Archer 28 should dispel that assumption. The defendant
19. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98( 1922).
20. Ibid.
21. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
22. Id. at 437.
23. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
24. FL.. STAT. § 374.27 (1951).
25. Blaekmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
26, Skiriotes v. State of Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
27. Id. at 76. This ease presents an interesting question. The purpose of the
statute is the preservation of certain fishing from unreasonable exploitation. Would the
Court find that jurisdiction existed over a non-citizen violating the statute in international
waters? Not to extend such jurisdiction would be, in effect, to put the State's own
citizens at a disadvantage. See 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 227 C (2d ed. 1947).
28. 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
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was charged with the violation of a United States statute29 when he appeared
before an American vice-consul in a foreign country and executed tinder
oath an application for a non-immigrant's visa. His defense was that he was
a non-resident alien of the United States and since criminal statutes have no
extra-territorial applicability as to him, the Court had no jurisdiction. The
Court used the "effect" principle holding that the fraud was not in the
act (which occurred in a foreign country) but in the result to be achieved. s0
It is significant to point out that greater concentration by the courts on
public or government interest seems to justify lesser consideration of the con-
ceptual territorial contacts which had so dominated our early law.
The cases presented have developed support for the proposition that
our early legal introversion and our reluctance to extend our criminal and
quasi-criminal statutes beyond our borders have been abandoned in less
than fifty short years. '17he following cases will attempt to show this change
toward extroversion which has appeared in a more controversial area, that
of our civil statutes.
One of the first statutes of a civil nature to be questioned as to its
applicability outside of our own territory was the Federal Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act.3Y An employee sued his employer under this statute for unpaid
overtime for work performed on a United States leasehold on the Crown
Colony of Bermuda. This highly controversial32 decision in Vermilya-Brown
Co. v. Connell?3 found the Court interpreting the statute to include work
performed in this area. The Court held the leased area to be a "territory"
within the meaning of the Act.3 4 .
Commenting on our established criminal jurisdiction Justice Reed con-
cluded: "A fortiori civil controls may apply, we think, to liabilities created
29. 34 STAT. 100 (1906), 22 U.S.C. § 131 (1946).
30. State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 99 F. Supp. 655, 665 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) (an interesting application of the Trading With The Enemy Act where the pur-
chaser of war confiscated bonds, bought in Switzerland, could not gain good title. God-
dard, J. said, "Since ... the defendant is now, and was at all times here involved, a citizen
of the United States, power existed to regulate his actions outside the territorial limits
of the United States whether or not the condemned act [buying the bonds] occurred
within the territory of a foreign nation.").
31. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1946).
32. Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 409 (1948) (Justice Jackson in the
dissent, voices the concern that "Such a decision by this Court initiates a philosophy of
annexation and establishes a psychological accretion to our possesion at the expense of
our lessors. . . .") Fuchs, Administrative Determinations And Personal Rights In The
Present Supreme Court, 24 IND. L.J. 164 (1949), "The Government argued vigorously
that affirmance ...which was favorable to the Employees' contention, would be unfortu.
nate in its effects upon our foreign relations. The dissenting opinion regards these effects
as attaching to the result in the Supreme Court." Comment, Overseas Effect Of Federal
Statutes, 1 STAN. L. REv. 768, 771 (1949). "The Executive Department opposed the
result reached. The State, Army and Navy Departments thought the results hampered
our foreign policy and good relations with the islands. The Administrator of the Act
prophesied fundamental administrative difficulties if coverage of the Act was extended.
to Bermuda and other bases."
33. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
34. Work done within the territorial limits of Canada did not come within this
statute in Bryne v. Metcalfe Const., 99 F. Supp. 635 (D. Neb. 1951).
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by statutory regulation of labor contracts, even if aliens may be involved,
where the incidents regulated occur on areas under the control, though not
within the territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty, of the nation enacting the
legislation. '3  It would not be venturous to interject the opinion that the
position of the court in the Blackmer case as to the problem being one of
statutory construction and not legislative power would not have been re-
stated in the Vermilya decision had the judicial thought been still under
the influence of the American Banana rationale.
With the holding barely rendered there was handed down in the same
year a decision interpretating the federal Eight Hour Law. 6 In Foley Bros.
v. Filardo7 an employee was suing for rights allegedly accruing tinder this
statute. The work was not performed on a leased area but on a government
project in Iraq and Iran. Justice Reed could not find any expression of Con-
gressional intent to extend this statute when he said: "The absence of any
distinction between citizen and alien labor indicates to us that the statute
was intended to apply only to those places where the labor conditions of
both citizen and alien employees are a probable concern of Congress."38s
The language of these two cases is extremely interesting when com-
pared with the remarks of Holmes in American Banana forty years pre-
viously. Ile said: "In the first place, the acts causing the damage were done,
so far as it appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States, and within
that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were gov-
erned by the act of Congress."3 9
The Federal Tort Claims Act40 which was pleaded in numerous cases
involving injuries arising outside of our territory has withstood extra-terri-
torial application. 41 The clear language of the Act, which stated among its
exclusions: "Any claim arising in a foreign country,"42 remained an obstacle
to the courts in applying it outside the country.
In United States v. Spelar43 the Court found an American leased air
base (of the same type as in the Vermilya case) in Newfoundland to be a
"foreign country" within the meaning of this Act. The Supreme Court's
position in Cobb v. United States" denying applicability of the statute to
Okinawa was weaker since our control over the island since the end of
35. Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948).
36. 27 STAT. 340 (1892), 37 STAT. 726 (1913), 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (1946).
37. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
38. Id. at 286. But in Finnan v. Elmhurst Contracting Co., 199 Misc. 1016, 107
N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. 1950) a New York court held the Eight Hour Law applicable
to employees working on a leased base in British Guiana.
39. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 353 (1909).
40. 62 STAT. 982 (1948), as amended 63 STAT. 106 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2671
et seq. (Supp. 1952).
41. Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (Saipan); Strancri
v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Belgium).
42. 62 STA'r. 982 (1948), as amended 63 STA'r. 106 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)
(Supp. 1952).
43. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
44. 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951).
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World War II was dangerously near to sovereignty. Apparently a de facto
sovereignty was not sufficient.
The serious and detailed consideration given these statutes by the
courts when they deny extra-territorial effect manifests little hesitation to
apply this legislation if they can find any Congressional intent in the acts
to do so.
With such a background it was not unusual for the appearance, late in
1952, of the Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. case.4 This was a suit under the
Lanham Trade Mark Act46 brought by an American corporation to enjoin
an American national from using the plaintiff company's trade-mark reg-
istered in the United States. The defendant was assembling watches in
Mexico and labeling them with the company trade name. The relationship of
the parties and the relief demanded should be pointed out. Here was a pri-
vate interest asking civil relief for the infringement, accomplished by acts in a
foreign country, of a private right acquired in the United States. The Court,
in granting relief by enjoining the defendant from doing an act in Mexico,
expressed the view that the legislative intent in this case was the decisive
question. The statute's purpose, "to regulate commerce within the control
of Congress," 47 was held to include jurisdiction over the acts complained
of." It would appear from this decision that the nationality of a party is
sufficient interest for the State to legislate all over the world in regards to
its citizens even to the extent of determining civil relationships.
Lest these cases suffer the rationalization that it is judicial rather than
legislative jurisdictional accretion, the 1952 Bankruptcy Amendment 4" should
be consulted. The amendment of Section 70 directed that "all property
wherever located . . .shall vest in the trustee."' 0 This is the first time that
Section 70 was amended.5 1 Before such a universalistic approach was mani-
fested, the statute can be said to have expressed the attitude of Story when
he said: "There is a marked distinction between a voluntary conveyance of
property by the owner, and a conveyance by mere operation of law ....
45. 73 Sup. Ct. 252 (1952).
46. 60 STAT. 427, 15 U.S.C. 1051 (1946); SEN. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong. 2dSess. (1946) (The purpose of this Act was to carry out our international commitments
to the end that American traders in foreign countries may secure the protection of their
trade-marks to which Congress felt they were entitled).
47. 60 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).
48. It is hard to see where the defendant's activities in Mexico are within Constitu-
tional definitions of commerce with foreign nations. What is significant is the willing-
neSS of the Court to abandon the early limitations.
49. 64 STAT. 26 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1952).
50. 52 S'rAT. 879 (1938), 64 STAT. 26 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (1952).
51. This amendment represents legislative response to the plea of Mr. Nadelmann
in 1946 after an amendment of the bankruptcy law which neglected to change section 70.
"Discussions of the possibilities of improvement have long centered around . . . the
theory of universality (ubiquity) and the theory of territoriality of bankruptcy. . . .The
serious consequences of lack of international cooperation in bankruptcy cases where assets
are located in more than one country have become even more apparent with the growing
intercourse between nations. Creditor nations, of course, the greatest sufferers." Nadel.
mann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflicts of Laws, 59 HAry. L. Riv. 1025(1946).
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But a Statutable conveyance, made tinder the authority of any legislature
cannot operate upon any property, except that, which is within its own
territory."5 2
The case decisions interpreting statutes as to their extra-territorial effect
show a growing momentum during the last half century toward expanding
our national policy to include outside areas if our legislative thought con-
siders such application necessary.
This progressive extension was illustrated by the following develop-
ments:
(1) Extra-territorial acts of our nationals which adversely affect
our internal commerce or foreign trade can be the subject
of prosecutions under the anti-trust acts.
(2) Extra-territorial acts of our nationals which directly harm
our government will come within the purview of our criminal
statutes.
(3) Extra-territorial acts by employees can gain for them special
legislative grants of certain private rights enforceable against
their employers.
(4) Acts by a national in another country which infringe upon
private rights acquired in this country are subject to injunc-
tive relief.
(5) Congress grants title to a trustee in bankruptcy of property
of the bankrupt wherever located.
These new formulas as to statutory applicability are comparable to the
developments in the tests of the treaty-making power. In this field the shift
of definitive emphasis was from one of what is a "proper subject" to the
more inclusive "national policy" concept. Such a rapid liberalization has
already resulted in a reaction as expressed by the proposed constitutional
amendment restricting the treaty-making power.58 The Bulova Watch case
is illustrative of the fact that such a reaction is not manifest in the extra-
territorialityof-jurisdiction field, but it would not be unreasonable to pre-
dict such a counter-tendency in the near future.
'DONALD A. WIESNER
52. 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 684 (3d ed. 1846).
53. The American Bar Association adopted to recommend the following constitu.
tional amendment: "A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this
Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. A treaty shall become effective as inter-
nal law in the United States only through legislation by congress which it could enact
under its delegated powers in the absence of such treaty." See Edwards, The Constitu-
tion, the Treaty Power and Juridicial lsolationalism, 14 U OF Pn-r. L. REv. 199 (1953).
